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1 Note that a small capital stock ceteris paribus should imply a high marginal prod-
uct of capital, such that all other things being equal capital should flow to poor
countries.
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We provide a brief account of the ongoing debate on the rela-
tionship between international capital flows and economic
growth. In particular, we argue that the current debate may
be enriched by looking more closely at the relationship
between these key variables and educational choice and pub-
lic education policy.
The sharp reduction of barriers to cross-border investments
during the last few decades has led to a breathtaking increase
in international capital flows. For instance, this development
becomes evident in the sheer number of bilateral investment
treaties, more than 2000 by 2005 [UNCTAD (2006)], that are
designed to protect foreign investors against expropriation.
Valued at current prices, foreign direct investment (FDI)
inflows at the global level have risen from U.S.$59 billion in
1982 to U.S.$1,271 billion in 2000, although declining there-
after to U.S.$648 billion in 2004 [UNCTAD (2001, 2005)].
This corresponds to an increase in the FDI stock from U.S.$
628 billion to U.S.$8,902 billion between 1982 and 2004
[UNCTAD (2005)]. 
International capital market integration raises at least three
important questions: Firstly, who are the recipient countries
of international capital? Secondly, what determines whether
or not a country attracts foreign capital? And finally, what are
the effects of international capital flows on the macroeco-
nomic performance of both host and source countries? 
Related to the first question, Nobel laureate Robert E. Lucas
famously asked, less than two decades ago, ‘Why doesn’t cap-
ital flow from rich to poor countries?’ [Lucas (1990)]. Since
then, however, capital inflows to developing countries have
surged (including FDI, on which we should mostly focus here)
— and they mainly came from developed countries. It is true
that the U.S. is still — at least, until recently it was — the
largest recipient of FDI (followed by the U.K.), with an inflow
of over U.S.$95 billion in 2004 (about 15 percent of world FDI
inflows), now hosting about one sixth of the world’s FDI
inward stock [UNCTAD (2005)]. But in 2004 developing coun-
tries received the considerable amount of U.S.$233 billion (36
percent of world FDI inflows). Between 1981-85, the annual
average inflows into these countries was only U.S.$13 billion.
For example, FDI inflows into China and Hong Kong combined
amounted to almost U.S.$95 billion in 2004 [UNCTAD
(2005)], which is roughly similar to the U.S. figure. And by
2005/06 China is said to have taken the leading position of
being the largest recipient of FDI from the world economy. 
On the second issue, the determinants of the direction of
international capital flows, one may again refer to the analy-
sis of Lucas (1990). Given that capital flows into a country
when its marginal product of capital (or the return to capital,
respectively) is relatively high, Lucas has pointed out that
due to typically low levels of human capital and low produc-
tivity in poor countries, capital returns may be low in spite of
the low capital stock1. Moreover, the costs of financing capital
inputs in a host country also depend on possible business
risks and legal barriers to investment (i.e., on various eco-
nomic and political institutions). 
Regarding the third question, an important ongoing debate is
the impact of FDI flows on an economy’s rate of GDP growth.
The question is not as much about whether FDI inflows posi-
tively affect growth, since according to the standard neoclas-
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sical growth model any increase in investment at some peri-
od (whether foreign or domestic) should raise subsequent
growth via a larger capital stock, but whether they help
improve productivity and/or the growth potential via spillover
effects, such as from adoption of new technology or
increased management know-how associated with FDI. 
Empirical results on technology spillovers from financial inte-
gration are mixed. For the period 1980-2000, Edison et al.
(2002) do not find a robust positive effect from various meas-
ures of the degree of international financial integration on per
capita income growth2. Borensztein et al. (1998) examine the
impact of FDI from industrial to developing countries on growth
in host countries in a panel estimation (with two time periods,
1970-79 and 1980-89) and find that the contribution of FDI to
growth is greater than that of domestic investment3. This is
indirect evidence for a technological spillover. Interestingly, the
paper suggests a positive interaction between FDI and human
capital for growth and argues that technology spillovers occur
only if human capital in a host country exceeds some minimal
level. This lends support to the idea that human capital in the
host country is needed to render it capable of absorbing knowl-
edge embodied in FDI inflows. Moreover, human capital seems
to be important for attracting foreign investment in the first
place, as argued by Lucas (1990). 
Focusing on FDI effects at the firm level within specific devel-
oping countries, the evidence on knowledge transfers is, at
best, weak. For example, in a widely-recognized study, which
employs plant-level data from Venezuela, Aitken and Harrison
(1999) find that the net effect of FDI inflows on productivity
is small, being negative for domestically owned plants. As
summarized by Rodrik (1999), ‘today’s policy literature is
filled with extravagant claims about positive spillovers from
FDI but the evidence is sobering.’ Alfaro et al. (2004) argue in
a cross-country study that the growth effect of FDI interacts
with the degree of development of local financial markets.
Their evidence suggests that domestic firms are unable to
reap the benefits of knowledge spillovers triggered by FDI
without being able to finance outlays for organizational
changes required to raise productivity. Hu and Jefferson
(2006) find that Chinese firms’ own research and develop-
ment (R&D) complements the technology transfer from both
domestic and foreign firms, but foreign direct investment
does not facilitate foreign technology spillovers. 
There is convincing evidence, however, that FDI flows
between developed countries can exert positive spillovers.
For instance, Bernstein and Mohen (1998) show that a higher
stock of R&D capital by Japanese firms in the U.S. raises pro-
ductivity in Japan and lowers unskilled labor intensities
there. However, there seems to be no significant spillover
effect to the benefit of U.S. firms holding R&D capital in
Japan. Also addressing spillovers from FDI inflows to the U.S.,
Roy and van den Berg (2006) provide time-series evidence on
a bi-directional relationship between U.S. growth and FDI
inflows. In another recent study, Branstetter (2006) attempts
to identify technological spillovers from FDI more directly. He
exploits data on citations of patents held by U.S. firms which
are made by Japanese firms when applying for a patent in the
U.S. By regressing the (log of) number of patent citations of
Japanese firms on their FDI stock in the U.S., he finds consid-
erable evidence that Japanese firms which hold FDI capital in
the U.S. indeed cite U.S. patents more frequently. 
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2 Focusing on FDI plus portfolio investment inflows over GDP as measure of financial
integration, Schularick and Steger (2006) reproduce this result for a similar time
period. Interestingly, however, they find a positive impact for the globalization era
before World War I.
3 Including also outward investment of developing countries, Khawar (2005) finds a
similar result in a cross-section analysis for the period 1970-91.
Abstracting from the issue of spillover effects, recent studies
on capital market integration have emphasized a further
channel through which FDI flows may affect economic
growth: human capital formation. The key assumption, which
gives rise to a link between capital flows and education and
therefore to human-capital driven growth, is the empirically
well-supported capital-skill complementarity. To fix ideas,
consider a three factor model of a perfectly competitive
economy, where skilled labor (S), unskilled labor (L), and
physical capital (K) enter an aggregate production function.
That is, output Y is produced according to Y = AF (K,S,L),
where A is a total factor productivity parameter which cap-
tures the state of technology and F is a linearly homoge-
neous, increasing, and concave production function. Capital-
skill complementarity may be defined to exist if the following
two conditions are met: firstly, the marginal product of capi-
tal, AFK, is increasing in skilled labor S (but not in L) and, sec-
ondly, the relative marginal product of skilled to unskilled
labor, FS/FL, is increasing in K.
Building upon the assumption of capital-skill complementari-
ty, Gradstein and Justman (1995) and Viaene and Zilcha
(2002) investigate the incentives to increase public expendi-
tures if a better skill supply leads to a capital inflow with pos-
itive effects on national income. In such a setting, locational
competition for mobile capital gives rise to an over-provision
of public education expenditures, calling for policy coordina-
tion. Egger et al. (2005) complement this literature by elabo-
rating on the individual incentives to participate in non-com-
pulsory, though publicly financed, higher education. In their
analysis, they distinguish between the share of educated
workers, determined by private incentives, and the quality of
human capital, which depends on public education policy. The
model predicts that capital market integration induces posi-
tive net capital inflows if human capital S is sufficiently abun-
dant, if productivity A is sufficiently high, or if (institutional)
impediments to investment are low. That is, the direction of
capital flows depends on the economy’s initial conditions (rel-
ative to the rest of the world) at the time capital markets
open up. Due to capital-skill complementarity, as just defined,
for given public education expenditures, an increase in net
capital inflow raises the incentives to acquire education by
raising the relative marginal product of skilled labor, FS/FL. To
the extent that a higher share of skilled labor promotes the
growth rate of total factor productivity, A, this provides novel
insights in how capital market integration can impact the
growth rate of GDP per capita. Moreover, public education
expenditures raise the share of skilled labor in an integrated
economy primarily through attracting foreign capital invest-
ment. Finally, treating education expenditure as endogenous,
the analysis suggests that, under optimal adjustment of pub-
lic education policy, educational attainment typically rises
after capital market integration unless unfavorable initial
conditions induce large capital outflows after integration.
These predictions are then tested by using data for the peri-
od 1960-2000 from 87 countries, focusing on FDI as a meas-
ure of international capital flows. Net capital flows are instru-
mented by a measure of international investment barriers,
provided by the Business Environment Risk Intelligence. The
empirical analysis largely confirms the main hypotheses
derived by Egger et al. (2005): firstly, net capital inflows —
whether or not they are treated as endogenous — significant-
ly affect participation in higher schooling (using various
measures thereof). Secondly, changes in investment barriers
and public education spending are important determinants of
net capital flows and through this channel affect the partici-
pation in higher education. Thirdly, capital flows significantly
affect economic growth through their effect on higher edu-
cation. 
These promising results should motivate further research on
the links between FDI and growth to education. While the lit-
erature has mainly focused on technological spillovers from
gross FDI inflows so far, the impact of financial integration on
education incentives and human capital-based growth
depends on the size of net capital inflows and how govern-
ments use education policy in order to attract foreign capital.
These insights may be used in future studies to reconcile the
conflicting evidence on the relationship between capital
mobility and growth. 
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